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DNA DRAGNET PRACTICES: ARE THEY
CONSTITUTIONAL?
I.

INTRODUCTION

The police know who committed the atrocious murder of twentyone-year-old Julie Busken - not by name, but by the DNA he left behind in
Julie's car.' On December 20, 1996, Julie had just finished her final semester of college at the University of Oklahoma. She was on her way to
Arkansas for Christmas break but never made it home. Police found Julie
raped and shot to death near a lake in Oklahoma not far from her apartment.2 Upon inspection of the crime scene, police found no evidence to
link them to the suspect, except for the DNA evidence left behind as a result of the rape. Armed with nothing more than the perpetrator's DNA, the
police tested 200 men who either lived near Julie or had a record of criminal violence.3 The warrantless search, referred to as a DNA dragnet,
yielded no matches. Nevertheless, police plan to conduct another DNA
dragnet of the same magnitude for Julie's murderer.4
In the past few years, at least five DNA dragnets have been conducted in America.5 Among the first occurred in San Diego, California
during a police search for a serial killer who murdered six women between
January and September 1990.6 Detectives investigated the neighborhoods
near the crime scenes and requested blood and saliva samples from 800

See Oklahoma Police Launch DNA Dragnet, OKLAHOMA CITY ASSOCIATED

PRESS, June 7, 2001.

2 See id.; see, e.g., Jennifer L. Brown, Police Begin Genetic Dragnet: 200 Tested,

Raising Privacy Concerns, THE TIMES-PICAYUNE (NEW ORLEANS), May 31, 2001 (ad-

dressing DNA dragnet practices, focusing on case of Julie Busken); see Julie DelCour, How
FarIs Too Far? DNA Dragnets Widen To Catch Attackers, THE TULSA WORLD, June 3.

2001 (addressing DNA dragnet practices, focusing on case of Julie Busken); see also Gooa
Morning America (ABC World News television broadcast, June 1, 2001) (broadcast focused on case of Julie Busken, use of DNA dragnet to catch killer).
3 See Oklahoma Police Launch DNA Dragnet, OKLAHOMA CITY ASSOCIATED
PRESS, June 7, 2001.
4 See id.
5 See Richard Willing, PrivacyIssue Is The Catch ForPolice DNA 'Dragnets,' USA
TODAY, Sept. 16, 1998.

6 See Philip P. Pan, Pr. Georges, The Chief Has Used Serial Testing Before; Farrell
Oversaw DNA Sampling of 2,300 in Florida, WASH. POST, Jan. 31, 1998.
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men matching8 a general description of the perpetrator. 7 One of the men
was the killer.
In Dade County, Florida, 2,300 men were tested in 1995 in an attempt to locate the killer of six prostitutes who dumped his victims outside
the Miami city limits. 9 Yet again in 1995, a DNA dragnet was conducted
in Ann Arbor, Michigan, for a serial rapist and murderer. 0
In 1998, in Prince Georges' County, Maryland, a fifty-year-old
nursing administrator was found bound, raped, and strangled to death in
her office. 1' After discovering the crime, police performed a DNA dragnet
to search for her killer.' 2 Since then, the county police chief has been collecting saliva samples in a mass collection that is expected to total 400 men
who either worked at or visited the medical center. 13 The latest of these
searches is the search for Julie Busken's killer.1 4 This tragic murder is the
most recent case in the
debate over the appropriateness of DNA dragnet
5

practices in America. 1

The practice of conducting DNA dragnets is a fast-growing evidentiary tool that has received wide acceptance abroad in countries such as
England, Germany, and France.16 This international trend has influenced
7
8

See id.
See id.

9 See id.; see also Willing, infra note 16 and accompanying text.
10 See Dateline NBC: Blood Simple (NBC television broadcast, July 19, i998); see
also Willing, infra note 16 and accompanying text.
11 See Philip P. Pan, Pr. Georges' Does Mass DNA Testing; Police Request Saliva
from All Men Questionedin Hospital Slaying Probe, WASH. POST, Jan. 30, 1998.
12 See Willing, infra note 16 and accompanying text; see also Philip P. Pan, Pr.
Georges' Does Mass DNA Testing; Police Request Saliva from All Men Questioned in
Hospital Slaying Probe, WASH. POST, Jan. 30, 1998; Dateline NBC: Blood Simple (NBC
television broadcast, July 19, 1998).
13 See id.
14 See Oklahoma Police Launch DNA Dragnet, OKLAHOMA CITY ASSOCIATED
PRESS, June 7, 2001 (focusing on case of Julie Busken); see also Julie DelCour, How Faris
Too Far? DNA Dragnets Widen to Catch Attackers, THE TULSA WORLD, June 3, 2001
(focusing on case of Julie Busken); Jennifer L. Brown, Police Begin Genetic Dragnet: 200
Tested, Raising Privacy Concerns, THE TIMES-PICAYUNE (NEW ORLEANS), May 31,
2001 (focusing on case of Julie Busken - legitimacy of DNA dragnet in Oklahoma); Good
Morning America (ABC World News television broadcast, June 1, 2001) (broadcast focused on case of Julie Busken, DNA dragnet legitimacy).
15 See Good Morning America (ABC World News television broadcast, June 1,
2001).
16 See Lynn Fereday, Comments at the Meeting of National Commission on the Future of DNA Evidence (July 26, 1999); see also Richard Willing, Many Rapists Were
Thieves First; Results May Lead to Taking Of DNA For Lesser Crimes, USA TODAY, July
10, 2000, at 3A. This article outlines the fact that the dragnetting approach is more common in Europe. Id. For example, in Germany, 16,400 men were tested in connection with
the investigation of a single rape and murder. Id. Following the Narborough murders,
British police made extensive use of DNA dragnet practices in investigations, allowing
sampling based only on an officer's suspicions. Id.; see also Richard Willing, Privacy Issue
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American evidentiary processes as well as American courts. 17 Moreover,
each of the fifty United States have passed legislation authorizing the use
of criminal DNA databases. 8 As of March 2000, all fifty states maintain
operational DNA databases that include the DNA records for sex offenders
and perpetrators of several felonies and lesser crimes. 19
Although this debate has not yet come before the Supreme Court, it
is ripe for consideration. Arguably, if the Supreme Court were to consider
whether the practice of conducting DNA dragnets was constitutional, the
Is The Catch For Police DNA 'Dragnets,' USA TODAY, Sept. 16, 1998.
17 See Aaron P. Stevens, Arresting Crime: Expanding The Scope Of
DNA Databases
In America, 79 TEX. L. REV. 921 (March 2001); see also Allison Puri, An International
DNA Database: Balancing Hope, PrivacyAnd Scientific Error, 24 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L.
REV. 341 (Spring 2001); Michelle Hibbert, DNA Databanks: Law Enforcement's Greatest
Surveillance Tool?, 34 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 767 (Fall 1999); see also People v. King,
99 Cal. Rptr. 2d 220, 227 (2000) (noting DNA testing helps government ensure innocent
persons not needlessly investigated). The California court held that the government had an
interest in solving past and future crimes and in discouraging criminals from recidivist
activities. Id. The court also noted, while DNA evidence works toward achieving these
objectives, it also serves the purpose of helping investigators rule out innocent suspects. Id.
"8 See ALA. CODE § 36-18-24 (Supp. 2000); ALASKA STAT. § 44.41.035 (Michie
2000); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-4438 (West Supp. 2000); ARK. CODE ANN. § 12-121105 (Michie 1999); CAL. PENAL CODE § 295 (West 1999); COLO. REV. STAT. § 17-2201 (1998); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 54-102g (West Supp. 2000); DEL. CODE ANN. tit.
28, § 4713 (1997); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 943.325 (West 1996 & Supp. 2001); GA. CODE
ANN. § 24-4-60 (1995 & Supp. 2000); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 706-603 (Michie 1999);
IDAHO CODE § 19-5501 (Michie 1997); 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/5-4-3 (West 1997
& Supp. 2000); IND. CODE ANN. § 10-1-9-1 (West Supp. 2000); IOWA CODE ANN. §
13.10 (West 2000); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-2511 (1995 & Supp. 2000); KY. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 17.170 (Michie 1996); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15:605 (West Supp. 2000); ME.
REV. STAT. ANN. tit. § 25, 1571 (West Supp. 2000); MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD.
PROC. § 10-915 (1998 & Supp. 2000); MASS. GEN. LAWS CH. 22E, § 2 (West Supp.
2000); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 28.171 (West Supp. 2000); MINN. STAT. ANN. §
299C.155 (West 1999); MISS. CODE ANN. § 45-3337 (2000); MO. REV. STAT. § 650.050
(Supp. 1992); MONT. CODE ANN. § 44-6-102 (1999); NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-4104 (Supp.
2000); NEV. REV. STAT. 176.0913 (2000); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 632-A: 21 (Supp.
2000); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 53:1-20.18 (West Supp. 2000); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 29-16-4
(Michie 1997); N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 995-c (McKinney 1996 & Supp. 2001); N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 15A-266.4 (1999); N.D. CENT. CODE § 31-13-03 (1996 & Supp. 1999); OHIO
REV. CODE ANN. § 2801.07 (West 1997 & Supp. 2000); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. § 74,
150.27 (West 1995); OR. REV. STAT. § 137.076 (1999); 35 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §
76511.302 (West Supp. 2000); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 12-1.5-4 (2000); S.C. CODE ANN. § 233-610 (Law. Co-op. 1997); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 23-5-14 (Michie 1998 & Supp. 2000);
TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-35-321 (1997 & Supp. 2000); TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. §
411.142 (Vernon 1998); UTAH CODE ANN. § 53-5-212.4 (1998); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. §
20, 1936 (2000); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-310.2 (Michie 2000); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 43.43.f752 (West 1998); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 15-2B-4 (Michie 2000); WIS. STAT.
ANN. § 165.77 (West 1997 & Supp. 2000); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 7-19-402 (Michie 1999).
19 See id.; see also Kathey Pruitt, House Oks DNA PrisonerFile, THE ATLANTA J. &
CONST., Mar. 10, 2000, at El, available at 2000 WL 5445627 (attributing explosion of state
DNA databases to availability of federal funding for such undertakings).
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large weight of the cases would suggest that it would pass constitutional
muster. The shocking implications this would have would be to subject
free citizens to DNA dragnets absent a warrant or probable cause. These
searches and seizures, albeit violating the most fundamental mandates of
the Fourth Amendment, are presumably supported by notions of legitimate
governmental interests and therefore could be upheld as constitutional.
This practice should not be allowed and the Supreme Court should strike
down any efforts to legitimize the enforcement of DNA dragnets upon free
citizens.
Part I of this Note addressed the practice of conducting DNA dragnets across America. Part II examines the constitutional implications of
conducting DNA dragnets, including an analysis of the seminal Fourth
Amendment decisions regarding searches and seizures, the warrant clause,
and issues that will ultimately influence how the Supreme Court will handle this controversy. Part III examines the levels of privacy expectations
of Americans, comparing free citizens' expectations of privacy to those of
convicted felons. Part IV raises and analyzes decisions in Massachusetts
that will impact the choice of whether or not to implement DNA dragnet
practices within the Commonwealth. Part V concludes the discussion by
offering the premise that DNA dragnet practices should not be upheld as
constitutional and that the Supreme Court should not support their validity
because to do so would be to compromise the protections that the Fourth
Amendment guarantees all free citizens of the United States.
II.

HISTORY

The Fourth Amendment provides "[tihe right of the people to be secure in their persons ... against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall
not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause...
,,20 This is a fundamental right to privacy that is guaranteed to all free
persons in the United States implicit in the concept of ordered liberty and
recognized by the Supreme Court through the Fourth Amendment to the
United States Constitution.21 It should be noted, however, that "the Fourth
Amendment does not protect all subjective expectations of privacy, but
only those that society recognizes as 'legitimate. ' ' 22 As a result, not all

20 U.S. CONST. amend. IV. The Fourth Amendment applies to the states through the
Fourteenth Amendment. See Shepherd v. State, 690 N.E.2d 318, 322 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997).
21 See Katz v. U.S., 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967) (explaining Fourth Amendment provides no general right to privacy, but protects what citizens seek to preserve as private).
22 See Vernonia Sch. Dist. v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 654 (1995) (citing New Jersey v.
T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 338 (1985)) (holding legitimate privacy expectation depends upon
individual's location and relationship to state when violation occurs).
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aspects of one's private life are safe from governmental searches and seizures, even without a warrant and even absent probable cause. 23
For example, in 1966, the Supreme Court in Schmerber v. California24 held that the taking of a blood sample from an individual constitutes a
search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. 25 The Court asserted
that this type of search expressly delves into the protections of personal
privacy and dignity that Americans deem basic necessities for a free society. 26 In Schmerber, the petitioner was arrested for driving while intoxicated and subjected to a blood test without his consent.27 The Court held
that this search and seizure, while conducted without a warrant, was not
considered a violation of petitioner's Fourth Amendment rights because
the police had probable cause to believe the suspect was intoxicated prior
to taking the blood sample. 28 The Court further reasoned that obtaining a
warrant could have resulted in the loss of evidence because of the time
delay in securing the warrant. 29 This case, for the first time, addressed the
Fourth Amendment issue with respect to intrusions into the human body
rather than with respect to state interferences with private property, houses,
and effects.3 °

The Supreme Court ultimately holds that whether a particular search
violates an individual's Fourth Amendment rights depends upon whether
23 See id.
24 384 U.S. 757 (1966).
25 See id. at 767.
26

See id. (holding blood tests conducted in reasonable manner do not violate person's

Fourth Amendment rights). The issue in Schmerber was whether the chemical analysis,
introduced as evidence in the case, should have been excluded as the product of an unconstitutional search and seizure. Id. at 767. The controversy rested on whether the police
were justified in requiring petitioner to submit to the blood test and whether the means of
taking his blood respected relevant Fourth Amendment standards of reasonableness. Id. at
767-68. The Court concluded that blood tests were conducted in a reasonable manner and
did not violate petitioner's Fourth Amendment rights. Id. at 771-72.
27 See id. at 758-59.
The facts in Schmerber establish that police had 'probable
cause' to conduct the blood tests, but that no warrant was issued. Id. at 768-70.
28 See id. at 771-72. The Court reasoned that the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement was waived because the police officer might have reasonably believed he was
confronted with an emergency situation in which the delay necessary to obtain a warrant
threatened to destroy the evidence (i.e., the blood alcohol level apparent in the petitioner's
body at the time his blood was drawn). Id. at 770. The Court carved out a 'special needs
exception' to the warrant requirement: i.e., if time is of the essence in procuring evidence,
the police in that situation may deem the circumstances an 'emergency.' Id. If those circumstances are present, the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment is waived. Id. at
770-71.
29 See id. at 770-71.
This decision created an exception to the standard Fourth
Amendment Warrant Clause (when time is of the essence to obtain evidence based upon
probable cause, a warrant need not be necessary, rendering the warrantless search constitutional). See id. at 768-71.
30 See Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 767. This decision was controversial because it was
the first time the Court held intra-body intrusions constitutional absent a warrant. Id.
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that individual's privacy expectations 3 fall within the scope of protection
guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment. 1
A. DecisionalInterpretationsOf "Search And Seizure," "Bodily Intrusions," And "The Warrant Clause" Of The Fourth Amendment
In a number of recent decisions, federal and state courts held that
DNA searches fall within the realm of the Fourth Amendment. 32 For example, in Patterson v. State,33 the Indiana Court of Appeals allowed the
admissibility of a DNA sample into evidence because the state's interest in
solving crimes outweighed the defendant's slight privacy interests in securing his DNA.34 In addition, courts recognize DNA sampling and profiling
as routine criminal investigative tools in America. 35 American courts interpret the validity of statutory and regulatory requirements for DNA sampling under Fourth Amendment analysis by weighing individual privacy
rights against state interests. 36 Specifically, these courts seek to determine
the standards for reasonableness of the particular search
and the degree to
37
which each search impinges upon fundamental rights.
In Schmerber, the Court held that blood tests do not necessarily
constitute an unduly extensive imposition on an individual's privacy and
bodily integrity. 38 Blood tests, the Court held, are considered reasonable
31 See Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 624-27 (1989).
32 See Patterson v. State, 742 N.E.2d 4, 8-9 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000) (reaffirming

Schmerber holding: testing procedures within meaning of search and seizures are within
scope of Fourth Amendment). See also Vernonia Sch. Dist. v. Acton, 505 U.S. 646 (1995);
Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602 (1989); Schmerber v. California, 384
U.S. 757 (1966).
" 742 N.E.2d 4 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000).
34 See id. (holding special needs render warrant and probable cause requirements of
Fourth Amendment impracticable).
35 See People v. King, 99 Cal. Rptr. 2d 220, 227 (2000) (noting DNA testing furthers
government interests in solving past and future crimes). The King court recognized the
government's interest in solving past and future crimes and in discouraging criminals from
recidivist activities. Id. See also Roe v. Marcotte, 193 F.3d 72, 79 (2d Cir. 1999) (noting
DNA profiling can have effect of restraining future acts of criminals).
36 See Roe v. Marcotte, 193 F.3d 72, 80 (2d Cir. 1999) (holding inmate sex offenders
required to submit blood to DNA data bank constitutional). The Second Circuit held the
procedure by which the inmates were required to submit blood samples for the state DNA
data bank required minimal intrusion when weighed against the inmates' Fourth Amendment rights and promoted an important state interest in maintaining public safety. Id.
37 See Vernonia Sch. Dist., 515 U.S. at 652 (stating student athletes have diminished
expectation of privacy). Vernonia stands for the proposition that student athletes are not
entitled to full Fourth Amendment protection because the state's interest in preventing drug
addiction among student athletes is compelling. Id. at 661-62. Student athletes, therefore,
have a decreased expectation of privacy, and mandatory testing is not a significant invasion
of privacy. Id. at 657.
38 See Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 771-72 (1966) (noting circumstances
surrounding blood extraction may make intrusion reasonable even without warrant).
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intrusions when time is of the essence in obtaining a blood sample. 9 Two
years later in Terry v. Ohio,40 the Court established a principle for individualized suspicion in weighing law enforcement's discretion while conducting warrantless searches of an individual by using a more objective
standard. 4 1 This standard requires an objective threshold that law enforcement officers are required to overcome when conducting warrantless
searches. 42 Similarly, the Supreme Court in Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n 43 considered the nature of blood tests, noting that the intrusion occasioned by a blood test is not significant, since such tests are
"commonplace in these days of periodic physical examinations." 44 The
Supreme Court held experience shows that the amount of "blood extracted
is minimal, and 4for
most people the procedure involves virtually no risk,
5
trauma or pain.
In Skinner, the Court ruled that the collection and subsequent analysis of biological samples, while constituting a search under the Fourth
Amendment, are reasonable if justified by "special needs beyond the normal need for law enforcement" that render the warrant and probable cause
requirements of the Fourth Amendment impracticable. 46 The Court con39 See id. at 770-71 (holding extraction of blood samples highly effective means of
determining degree of intoxication). The Court held that, while the taking of a blood sample without a warrant is a search and seizure well within the confines of the Fourth
Amendment, if the circumstances render the taking of the blood sample an emergency situation, such as a situation where the destruction of evidence is imminent if the police take the
time to obtain a warrant, then the warrant requirement is waived in this special circumstance. Id.
40 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
41 Id. at 4 (describing more objective standard for weighing law enforcement's discretion in conducting warrantless searches). The decision in Terry sought to implement a
"totality of the circumstances" test that would balance the privacy expectations of the suspect against law enforcement concerns to determine if the search was reasonable. Id. at 2122.
42

See id.

4' 489 U.S. 602 (1989).
44 Id. at 624-25. In Skinner, the Court held that the permissibility of a particular

practice of bodily intrusion "is judged by balancing the intrusion on the individual's Fourth
Amendment interests against the state's promotion of legitimate governmental interests."
Id. at 619; see also Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 654 (1979); U.S. v. Martinez-Fuerte,
428 U.S. 543 (1975).
45 See Skinner, 489 U.S. at 624-25 (quoting Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757,
771 (1966)) (declaring society recognizes notion that blood tests do not compromise individual expectations of privacy or bodily integrity).
46 See id. at 619 (quoting Griffin v. Wisc., 483 U.S. 868, 873 (1987)) (referring
to
federal regulation requiring railroad industry to conduct breath and urine analysis in pursuit
of public safety). In Skinner, the Court acknowledged that during the operations of a regulated industry, such as a railroad, it is necessary to conduct toxicological tests because they
are not administered to produce evidence in the prosecution of it's employees, but rather to
prevent accidents and casualties in railroad operations that could result from the impairment
of railroad employees. Id. at 620-21. The Court further explained that the interest of the
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cluded that while a nonconsensual blood extraction is an invasion of
Fourth Amendment rights, the railway is a "regulated" industry with compelling safety interests.47 Thus, the threshold for privacy rights is lowered
for employees who work in governmentally regulated industries. 48 Ultimately, as seen in Griffin v. Wisconsin,4 9 when the state regulates a particular industry, a court may find there are special needs beyond normal law
enforcement that
may
justify departures from usual warrant and probable
S
50

cause requirements.

Decided on the same day as Skinner, the Court in National Treasury
Employees Union v. Von Raab,5 1 held a warrant is not required when balancing individual privacy rights of United States Customs' Service employees, who were required to take drug tests in the course of their employment, against compelling governmental interests. 52 If, in the course of
their employment these employees were directly involved in drug interdiction, were required to carry a firearm, or handled classified material, then
the government had a compelling interest in ensuring that they were physically fit and had unimpeachable judgment that outweighed those employees' privacy interests.
The Court reasoned, since the Customs Service's
program narrowly defined the specific circumstances justifying the testing
traveling public justifies the privacy intrusions at issue absent a warrant or individualized
suspicion. Id. at 621.
47 See id. at 616-17 (holding even less intrusive methods of collecting samples, and
later chemical analysis, implicates Fourth Amendment privacy interests). The Court also
held that the railway's safety interests outweighed its employee's privacy rights because the
railway is a regulated industry, and thus, the need for regulation thereof provides an exception to the usual requirements of the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 633.
48 See id. at 620.
4' 483 U.S. 868 (1987).
so Id. at 873-74.
5I 489 U.S. 656 (1989).
52 Id. at 666-67 (holding U.S. Customs' Employees have diminished expectation of
privacy in course of employment). In this case, the U.S. Custom's Service required drug
testing of employees directly involved in drug interdiction operations, who were required to
carry a firearm in the course of their employment, or who handled classified material. Id.
The drug tests were designed to detect the presence of either marijuana, cocaine, opiates,
amphetamines, or phencyclidine. Id. The union argued that the drug testing program was
unreasonable because it was not based on individualized suspicion of the employees who
were tested. Id. The Court rejected these arguments holding that the government's compelling interest in ensuring that employees directly involved in drug interdiction or who were
required to carry firearms, be physically fit and have unimpeachable integrity and judgment,
which outweighed the employees' privacy interests. Id.
53 See id. at 670-72 (holding Customs employees have diminished expectation of
privacy). The Court in National Treasury established another 'special needs' exception to
the warrant and probable cause requirements of the Fourth Amendment. Id. As with the
railroad industry, the U.S. Customs industry is another regulated industry, and as such, its
employees have a diminished expectation of privacy because of the nature of the employment. Id. The Customs industry requires a heightened measure of security and public
safety that outweighs the privacy interests of its employees. Id.
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and the permissible limits of such intrusions, the blood testing withstood
constitutional scrutiny. 54 The Court went on to hold that the Customs Service's drug testing program was not designed to serve the "ordinary needs
of law enforcement" because they could not be used in a criminal prosecution of the employee without his consent. 55 The purpose of this program
was to "deter drug use among those eligible for promotion to sensitive positions with[in] the Service and to prevent the promotion of drug users in
those positions., 56 The Court in National Treasury reasoned that these
governmental interests, as previously seen in Skinner, presented a special
need that justified the departure from the ordinary warrant and probable
cause requirements of the Fourth Amendment. 57 These cases seem to suggest that under similar circumstances, a DNA dragnet, if conducted in response to a 'special need' such as one present within a governmentally
regulated industry, would be upheld as constitutional.5 8
Both the Skinner and National Treasury decisions carved out the
first special needs exception to the warrant and probable cause requirements of the Fourth Amendment in determining that employees of regulated industries have diminished expectations of privacy.59 Six years later,
the Court added the second special needs exception to the warrant and
probable cause requirements of the Fourth Amendment when it decided
that student athletes also have a diminished expectation of privacy. 60 In
Vernonia School District v. Acton, 6 1 petitioner school district required student athletes to submit to random drug testing. 62 Respondents, a seventh
grade student and his parents, refused to sign the testing consent form.6 3
The Court held that the student athlete's Fourth Amendment interests were
outweighed by the state's compelling interest in preventing drug addiction
among student athletes. 64 In Vernonia, the Court held that the standard of
54 See id. at 666-67. The Court reasoned that in light of the evidence of the case,
which demonstrated that there was a national crisis in law enforcement caused by the
smuggling of illicit narcotics, the Government had a "compelling interest in ensuring that
front-line interdiction personnel were physically fit and had unimpeachable integrity and
judgment." Id. at 670.
55 See id. at 666.
56 See id.
57 See Nat'l Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 666 (1989).
58 See supra notes 37-57 and accompanying text (supporting proposition).
59 See id.; see also Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602 (1989).
60 See Vernonia Sch. Dist. v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646 (1995).
61 515 U.S. 646 (1995).
62 Id. at 650.
63 See id. at 651-52.
64 See id. at 664-65. The Court noted that school children are regularly submitted to
physical examinations and are required to be vaccinated against communicable diseases.
Id. at 656. It further reasoned that student athletes have an even lower expectation of privacy because students engaging in sports regularly change clothes and shower in lockerrooms together. Id. at 657. The Court reasoned that by choosing to join a school athletic
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reviewing the "constitutionality of a governmental search is reasonableness. ' 65 It noted, "whether a particular search meets the reasonableness
standard is judged by balancing its intrusion on the individual's Fourth
Amendment interests against its promotion of a legitimate governmental
interest. 66 If the governmental interests are compelling, and the intrusion
on the individual is minimal in light of that compelling interest, courts will
find the intrusion does not violate any Fourth Amendment rights.67
The convicted felon class is the third special needs exception to the
warrant and probable cause requirements of the Fourth Amendment, but it
is not without considerable opposition.68 Justice Dorothy W. Nelson for
the Ninth Circuit strongly dissented in Rise v. State of Oregon,69 in which
the majority held a state statute "does not violate the Fourth Amendment
by requiring convicted murderers and sex offenders to submit a blood
sample for DNA analysis to create an identification data bank." 70 Judge
team, students voluntarily subject themselves to a degree of regulation even higher than that
imposed on students generally. Id. For example, it noted that student athletes routinely
have to submit to a preseason physical exam that includes giving a urine sample. Id. Consequently, "students who voluntarily participate in school athletics have reason to expect
intrusions upon normal rights and privileges, including privacy." Id.
65 515 U.S. 646 (1995) (holding student athletes not entitled to full Fourth Amendment protection). The Court held that the state's interest in preventing drug addiction
among student athletes was compelling given that the testing requirements were not a significant invasion of privacy and the students' decreased expectation of privacy due to their
involvement in school athletic programs. Id. at 662.
66 See id. at 652-53 (quoting Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 654 (1979)) (holding
where search undertaken by law enforcement officers, reasonableness standard requires
officers to obtain warrant). This standard is inapposite to the present set of facts in that the
search conducted in Vernonia was not designed to discover evidence of criminal wrongdoing, but to deter drug addiction among student athletes. Id. at 650.
67 See Vernonia Sch. Dist., 515 U.S. at 655-56 (holding schoolchildren have diminished expectation of privacy as school officials act in loco parentis capacity). The Court in
Vernonia acknowledged that public schools, like private schools, have a degree of responsibility for schoolchildren. Id. School officials have a degree of control over students and the
duty to teach the habits and manners of social life. Id. The Court, however, pointed out
that while students do not abandon all of their fundamental rights when they enter the classroom, school officials do have a right to administer appropriate disciplinary measures. Id.
68 See Rise v. State of Oregon, 59 F.3d 1556 (9th Cir. 1995) (holding genetic information gathering from convicted felons for identification purposes does not violate Fourth
Amendment).
69 59 F.3d 1556 (9th Cir. 1995).
70 Id. at 1564. The majority in Rise held that Oregon's Ch. 669, which allowed for
the extraction of DNA information from convicted murderers or sex offenders absent a
warrant or probable cause, did not result in an unreasonable intrusion into the individual's
privacy rights and was justified by law enforcement purposes. Id. at 1559. The court drew
the distinction between gathering genetic information from free persons, which generally
does require a warrant supported by probable cause, as opposed to gathering the same type
of information from the convicted murderer or sex offender. Id. at 1560. It reasoned that
Ch. 669 only authorized the Department of Corrections to obtain blood samples from certain classes of convicted felons in order to create an identification record for possible future
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Nelson's dissent asserted DNA testing is an intrusion into bodily integrity
that compromises the cherished value of privacy in our society.7 ' Judge
Nelson further stated that the Fourth Amendment forbids any such intru72
sions on the "mere chance that desired evidence might be obtained.,
Judge Nelson urged "forced blood extraction intrudes on the private personal sphere and infringes upon an individual's 'most personal and deeprooted expectations of privacy. '73 Though unpersuasive to the majority,
Judge Nelson's dissent was recognized nationally as a preeminent counterargument to forced DNA sampling (i.e., DNA dragnet practices).74
In 1997, the Court heard a case that helped to define and restrain
government programs that called for drug testing of official candidates.7 5
In Chandler v. Miller,76 a Georgia statute requiring candidates for designated state offices to undergo urinalysis drug testing was held to violate the
Fourth Amendment.77 The Court opined that to be reasonable under the
Fourth Amendment, "a search ordinarily must be based on individualized
suspicion of wrongdoing. 7 8 The Court held that there are certain exceptions to the warrant and probable cause requirements of the Fourth
79
Amendment that are accepted based upon special societal interests.
When these special societal interests are alleged by the government, such
as public safety in maintaining regulated industries, and the interest in drug
use. Id. In addition, these persons did not have the same expectations of privacy in their
genetic information that free persons had. Id. Lastly, The Ninth Circuit held once a person
has been convicted of one of the enumerated felonies "under Chapter 669, his identity has
become a matter of state interest and he has lost any legitimate expectation of privacy in the
identifying information derived from the blood sampling." Id.
71 See id. at 1564 (Nelson, J.,
dissenting) (arguing majority erred in failing to find
Fourth Amendment violation in nonconsensual DNA analysis of convicts).
72 See id. (quoting Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 769-70 (1966)) (holding
individual privacy interests protected by Fourth Amendment forbids unwarranted, intrusive
searches on possibility of match). Judge Nelson noted that in Schmerber, the Court reasoned that only when law enforcement personnel are faced with exigent circumstances,
such as the need to preserve evidence of a crime and the police have probable cause to link
the DNA evidence to a crime already under investigation, is it allowable to conduct nonconsensual blood extraction from a suspect absent a warrant. Id.
73 See id. at 1565 (quoting Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 760 (1985)).
74 See Rise v. State of Oregon, 59 F.3d 1556, 1565 (9th Cir. 1995).
75 See Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305 (1997).
76 520 U.S. 305 (1997).
77 Id. (holding requirement that official candidates pass drug test not within category
of constitutionally permissible suspicionless searches). The ChandlerCourt held that where
neither public safety nor a special need beyond normal law enforcement is a genuine concern for the state, the Fourth Amendment prohibits suspicionless searches absent a warrant
or probable cause. Id. at 323. The majority concluded the state had failed to show a special
need sufficiently vital to suppress the Fourth Amendment's normal requirement of individualized suspicion. Id. at 317-22.
78 See id. at 313 (quoting Vernonia Sch. Dist. v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 664 (1995)).
79 See id. at 313 (citing Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 619
(1989)).
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testing student athletes, the courts must conduct an inquiry examining the
competing individual privacy issues and those public interests advanced by
the government. 80 Searches conducted without grounds for suspicion have
been upheld, but only in certain limited circumstances. 8 1 The Court then
had to determine if this program ranked among the limited circumstances
in which suspicionless searches were allowed. 82 Ultimately, the Court held
that Georgia's program did not fit into the same category as drug testing
for student athletes or for customs and railway employees because the governmental interests in requiring urinalysis were not as compelling as in the
prior cases. 83
While requiring official candidates for public office to submit to
suspicionless testing exploits the candidate's expectation of privacy, it is
clear that convicted felons do not enjoy the same privacy privilege. 84 In
Roe v. Marcotte,8 5 the Second Circuit held that Connecticut General Statute § 54-102g, requiring all convicted sex offenders to submit blood samples for inclusion in a DNA data bank, was constitutional8 6 The court held
the Connecticut DNA statute survived Fourth Amendment scrutiny because of the minimal intrusion involved in conducting the DNA testing
90 See id. at 314; see also Nat'l Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S.
656, 656-66 (1989).
81 See id. at 314; see also Nat'l Treasurv, 489 U.S. at 656-66. These circumstances
include brief stops for questioning and observation at a fixed border patrol checkpoint (see
U.S. v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 545-50 (1975)), or at sobriety checkpoints (see
Mich. Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 447 (1990)), and administrative inspections in 'closely regulated' businesses (see New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691, 703-04
(1987)).
82 See Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 314 (1997) (holding requirement that official
candidates pass drug test not within category of constitutionally permissible suspicionless
searches); see supra note 77 and accompanying text.
83 See id. at 319-23 (stating Georgia's program failed to meet special needs requirement for suspicionless testing of individuals). In Chandler, the Court compared Georgia's
program of requiring candidates to state office to submit to genetic testing against other
circumstances where the Supreme Court found exigent circumstances allowing for suspicionless testing of individuals. Id. The Court determined that Georgia's program failed to
establish a special need that would allow for suspicionless testing of individuals seeking
public office absent a warrant supported by probable cause. Id.
84 See Roe v. Marcotte, 193 F.3d 72, 74 (2d Cir. 1999) (holding DNA statute survives
Fourth Amendment scrutiny, required minimal intrusion and promoted state interest).
8 193 F.3d 72 (2d Cir. 1999).
86 Id. at 74. The statute at issue in Roe required all convicted sex offenders to submit
a blood sample for inclusion in Connecticut's DNA data bank. Id. The petitioner argued
that this statute violated his Fourth Amendment rights because it compelled the taking of
DNA evidence unsupported by a warrant based upon probable cause. Id. The Court in Roe
rejected this argument holding that the state had a right to maintain public safety and institutional security that outweighed privacy expectations of convicted felons. Id. at 77-78. It
joined three other circuit courts in carving out a special need exception to the warrant and
probable cause requirements of the Fourth Amendment with respect to convicted felons. Id.
at 82.
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when weighed against the important state interest in public safety.87 In
Roe, the Second Circuit found support for its holding based upon the
precedent established by three other circuit courts that had examined the
constitutionality of nearly identical DNA statutes. 88 The subject of convicted felons provides the Supreme Court with the most compelling argument for allowing DNA dragnet practices - the legitimate governmental
interest of promoting the health, safety, comfort, morals, and welfare of the
general public and is more thoroughly examined in Section III of this
Note.8 9
B. The Balancing Act: What The Supreme Court and the Commonwealth
of MassachusettsShould Look To In Determining Whether To Implement
DNA DragnetPractices

According to the Supreme Court, the question of whether state
DNA testing procedures pass Fourth Amendment muster should be determined by balancing its intrusion on the individual's privacy interests

against the promotion of legitimate governmental interests. 9° In determining whether the balance permits warrantless, suspicionless testing (i.e.,
DNA dragnets), courts consider "the scope of the particular intrusion, the
manner in which it is conducted, the justification for initiating it, and the
place in which it is conducted." 9' If the governmental interest outweighs
an individual's expectations of privacy, the procedure will pass constitutional muster.92
87

See id. at 79-80 (holding against inmate sex offenders' challenges to state statute

requiring submission of blood to DNA data bank). The Second Circuit held that the Connecticut DNA testing procedure required a minimal intrusion to the individual inmate while
it promoted an important state interest in maintaining public safety. Id.
88 See id.; see also Boling v. Romer, 101 F.3d 1336, 1338-40 (10th Cir. 1996) (holding governmental goal in making permanent identification record of convicted felons outweighs inmates' privacy rights). The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit relied on
the Ninth and Fourth Circuits, which faced similar challenges to similar statutes and concluded that although obtaining blood and/or saliva samples is a search and seizure implicating Fourth Amendment concerns, these concerns were not applicable given the governmental interest in making a permanent identification record of convicted felons for the purpose
of resolving future crimes. Id. at 1340; see Rise v. State of Oregon, 59 F.3d 1556 (9th Cir.
1995); Jones v. Murray, 962 F.2d 302 (4th Cir. 1992).
89 See infra notes 123 and 124 and accompanying text.
90 See People v. King, 99 Cal. Rptr. 2d 220, 228 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000); see also People
v. Wealer, 636 N.E.2d 1129 (I11.
App. Ct. 1994); State v. Olivas, 856 P.2d 1076 (Wash.
1993) (drawing blood from convicted felons to establish DNA data bank for use in future
prosecution of recidivist acts does not violate Fourth Amendment). Id. at 1085-91.
91See People, 99 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 225 (quoting Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 530, 559
(1979)).
92 See id. at 228. In analyzing the Fourth Amendment issues, the King
court acknowledged that the nonconsensual extraction of blood is an invasion of the rights protected
by the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 224. The court noted, however, that only unreasonable
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EXPECTATIONS OF PRIVACY

The right to privacy is not explicitly expressed in any section of the
United States Constitution. 93 Nevertheless, courts find a right to privacy to
be implicit in the concept of ordered liberty derived from the Fourteenth
Amendment.9 4 This right to privacy includes the right to be free from illegal searches and seizures.95 Courts classify the analysis of DNA samples
as searches within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, applicable to the
states through the Fourteenth Amendment.9 6 It is in the context of the
Fourth Amendment that courts analyze the right to privacy issues with
regard to DNA sampling.9 7 Opponents of utilizing DNA dragnet practices
in America draw upon the concept of the preservation of individual privacy
98
They argue that, at a minimum, DNA
interests as their core argument.
test results provide extremely personal data about an individual
and thus,
constitute an intrusion into an individual's bodily integrity. 99 Whether or
searches and seizures violate Fourth Amendment requirements. Id. It then announced a
balancing test whereby the court's task is to balance the intrusion on the individual's Fourth
Amendment interests against the legitimate governmental interests at stake. Id. The court
held that the ultimate measure of the constitutionality of a governmental search is reasonableness. Id. at 225. The final holding in King was that the search was reasonable because
along with imprisonment for convicted offenses comes the loss of significant rights. Id. at
226. The court concluded that "any argument that Fourth Amendment privacy interests do
not prohibit gathering information concerning identity from the person of one who has been
convicted of a serious crime, or of retaining that information for crime enforcement purposes, is an argument that long ago was resolved in favor of the government." Id. at 227.
The rationale behind the holding is: "[tihe government has an undeniable interest in crime
prevention.... [I]t has interests in solving crimes that have been committed, in bringing the
perpetrators to justice and in preventing, or at least discouraging, them from committing
additional crimes.... DNA testing unquestionably furthers these interests." Id. at 227-28.
93 See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
94 See Webb v. Goldstein, 117 F. Supp. 2d 289, 296 (E.D.N.Y 2000); see also
Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 598 (1977); Doe v. City of New York, 15 F.3d 264, 267 (2d
Cir. 1994). The above cited cases focus on the evolution of the right to privacy.
95 See Webb v. Goldstein, 117 F. Supp. 2d 289, 296 (E.D.N.Y 2000); see also
Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 598 (1977); Doe v. City of New York, 15 F.3d 264, 267 (2d
Cir. 1994).
96 See Patterson v. State, 742 N.E.2d 4, 8 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000) (reaffirming Schmerber holding; testing procedures within meaning of search and seizures; within scope of
Fourth Amendment); see also Shepherd v. State, 690 N.E.2d 318 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997)
(holding collection and analysis of blood search within meaning of the Fourth Amendment).
The Patterson court held the Fourth Amendment applies to states through the Fourteenth
Amendment. Id. Further, the court held that "the analyses of biological samples are
searches within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment." Id.
97 See Shepherd v. State, 690 N.E.2d 318 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997).
98 See Rise v. State of Oregon, 59 F.3d 1556, 1564-65 (9th Cir. 1995) (Nelson, J.
dissenting); supra notes 70-72 and accompanying text.
99 See id.; see also Dan L. Burke & Jennifer A. Hess; Genetic Privacy: Constitutional Considerations In Forensic DNA Testing, 5 GEO. MASON U. CIV. RTS. L.J. 22
(1995); Michael Avery, Landry v. Attorney General: DNA Databanks Hold A Mortgage
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not a particular individual has an expectation of privacy is the central axis
upon which this controversy turns.
A.

The Free Citizen

Recent cases give guidelines for analyzing when and who has a
valid expectation of privacy. 00 In Whalen v. Roe,' 0 ' a case involving a
person's right to maintain the confidentiality of prescription drug use, the
Supreme Court held that the right to privacy is not absolute.' 0 2 Each case
depends upon balancing the severity of any privacy invasion against the
state's interest in obtaining it. 1°3 In Doe v. City of New York,'0 4 the Second
Circuit ruled that only a substantial state interest could outweigh the individual's interest in the confidentiality of his medical condition. 0 5 While
courts recognize the free citizen's right to privacy in his serious medical
condition, courts have also held that where governmental interests outweigh the privacy expectations of free citizens, the citizens' rights can be
legally compromised. 16
B.

The Convicted Felon

Unlike free citizens, convicted felons' privacy expectations are di08
10 7
In Rise v. State of Oregon,
minished with respect to DNA sampling.
On PrivacyRights, BOSTON BAR JOURNAL (2000).
1'o See Bond v. United States, 529 U.S. 334 (2000).
101 429 U.S. 589 (1977).
102 Id. at 598 (holding New York state's program constitutional). The court held the
New York program's purpose was to maintain computer files identifying persons using
prescriptions drugs and did not pose a threat to individual's privacy interest in confidentiality of medical treatment when compared to the state's legitimate concern with minimizing
abuse of controlled substances. Id.
03 See id.
104 15 F.3d 264 (2d Cir. 1994).
05 Id. at 267 (held plaintiff had constitutional right to privacy in HIV status because
such personal information protected). The Court held Doe had a right to keep private his
positive HIV status because one's personal medical condition is generally a matter one is
entitled to keep private. Id. at 269.
106 See id.; see also Vernonia Sch. Dist. v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646 (1995); Skinner v. Ry.
Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602 (1989); Nat'l Treasury Employees Union v. Von
Raab, 489 U.S. 656 (1989); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966); Roe v. Marcotte,
193 F.3d 72 (2d Cir. 1999); Shaffer v. Saffle, 148 F.3d 1180 (10th Cir. 1998); Boling v.
Romer, 101 F.3d 1336 (10th Cir. 1996); Rise v. State of Oregon, 59 F.3d 1556 (9th Cir.
1995); Jones v. Murray, 962 F.2d 302 (4th Cir. 1992); Patterson v. State, 742 N.E.2d 4 (Ind.
Ct. App. 2000); People v. King, 99 Cal. Rptr. 2d 220 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000); People v.
Wealer, 636 N.E.2d 1129 (I11.App. Ct. 1994); Kruger v. Erickson, 875 F. Supp. 583 (D.
Minn. 1994); Patrick (Damon) Smith v. State of Indiana, 744 N.E.2d 437 (Ind. 2001); State
v. Olivas, 856 P.2d 1076 (Wash. 1993); Doles v. State, 994 P.2d 315 (Wyo. 1999).
107 See Rise, 59 F.3d at 1559-60; supra notes 70-72 and accompanying text.
o' 59 F.3d 1556 (9th Cir. 1995).
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the Ninth Circuit held that procuring genetic information from a convicted
felon through blood sampling for identification purposes did not create
more than a minimal intrusion upon the individual's Fourth Amendment
privacy rights. 10 9 In addition, the court noted that the type of DNA testing
conducted in Rise was applied only to certain classes of convicted felons to
create a record for future identification purposes.' 10 The court in Rise reasoned these specifically identified classes of convicted felons did not have
the same expectations of privacy in their genetic information that "free
persons" had."'1 The court held, "[o]nce a person is convicted of one of the
felonies included as predicate offenses under Chapter 669, his identity has
become a matter of state interest and he has lost any legitimate expectation
of privacy in the identifying information derived from the blood sam-

pling."' 12
Similarly, the Fourth Circuit held in Jones 1'. Murray11 3 that while
intrusions into a free person's privacy, without Fourth Amendment protections, are not permissible, those same protections are not afforded to individuals lawfully convicted and incarcerated of criminal offenses. 14 Based
on the holding in Jones, the Fourth Circuit held in People v. King 1 5 that
once a felon is convicted and incarcerated, his identity becomes a matter of
state interest for prison officials.' 16 Further, the Fourth Circuit held, "there
is no question that the state's interest extends to maintaining a permanent
record of identity to be used as an aid in solving past and future crimes,
and this interest overcomes any privacy rights the individual might re-

'09 Id. at 1564 (holding Oregon ch. 669 does not violate Fourth Amendment). The
Ninth Circuit ruled that requiring convicted murderers and sex offenders to submit blood
samples for DNA analysis and to create identification data bank was constitutional. Id.
The Court held that the intrusion to convicted felons was not unconstitutional because the
statute only required samples from specifically convicted murderers and sex offenders who
have diminished expectations of privacy. Id. at 1559-60; see supra notes 70-72 and accompanying text.
Io See id. at 1559-60. The Court held that only specific classes of offenders were
subjected to blood sampling, and as such, ch. 669 did not violate the Fourth Amendment
because it was 'narrowly tailored' to meet the state's interests. Id.
I1 See id. (holding specific class of convicted felons' privacy expectations diminished).
'12 See id. at 1560 (holding specific class of convicted felons' identities are matters of
state interest).
...962 F.2d 302 (4th Cir. 1992).
114 Id. at 306 (holding convicted felons' privacy protections diminished once confined
to custody of state). The Fourth Circuit analogized the taking of blood samples to fingerprinting suspects. Id. It announced in Jones that the Fourth Amendment does not require
an additional finding of individualized suspicion before blood can be taken absent a warrant
or probable cause from an incarcerated felon for the purposes of identifying him. Id. at
306-07.
"' 99 Cal. Rptr. 2d 220 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002).
116 Id. at 227; see supra note 92 and accompanying text.
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tain." 17 By committing crimes, persons such as the appellant in King have
essentially forfeited any legitimate expectations of privacy in their identities.' 18With respect to DNA sampling, the King court held the state has an
irrefutable interest in preventing crimes from occurring, in solving past
crimes, and ensuring that criminals answer for their wrongdoings.' 19 DNA
testing indisputably helps to further these goals because of its ability to
match profiles derived from crime scene evidence to DNA profiles already
existing in data banks. 20 The Fourth Circuit maintains that DNA technology helps law enforcement officials in solving crimes accurately and expeditiously while simultaneously preventing
unnecessary intrusions into pri2'
innocent.'
the
of
expectations
vacy
C.

The GovernmentalInterest

The ultimate measure of the constitutionality of a governmental
search, including a DNA dragnet, is "reasonableness." 122 States claim to
have an interest in promoting DNA dragnets in criminal investigations as a
function of their police powers. 123 It is an accepted premise that the government may exercise its police powers to promote the health, safety, comfort, morals, and welfare of the general public. 24 States promote the use of
DNA analysis as a powerful investigative tool that can connect suspects to
crimes or can exonerate the innocently accused. 125 As a result, states assert
a substantial interest under the Fourth Amendment balancing test in promoting the use of DNA testing.126 This premise leads to the conclusion
that DNA dragnet practices, although conducted in violation of Fourth
117See People, 99 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 227; supra note 92 and accompanying text.
"8 See People, 99 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 227; supranote 92 and accompanying text.
"'9

120
121

See People, 99 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 227; supranote 92 and accompanying text.
See People, 99 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 227; supra note 92 and accompanying text.
See People, 99 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 227 (citing support for using DNA testing to further

law enforcement objectives); supra note 92 and accompanying text.
122 See Vernonia Sch. Dist. v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 652 (1995) (announcing reasonableness standard in evaluating constitutionality of governmental search). In Vernonia, the
Court held that the state's interest in preventing drug addiction among student athletes was
reasonable given the student's decreased expectation of privacy and that the testing requirements were not a significant invasion of privacy. Id. at 662.
123 See Patterson v. State, 742 N.E.2d 4, 11 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000). In Patterson, the
Indiana Court of Appeals affirmed the defendant's convictions because the state's interest
in solving crimes outweighed the defendant's slight privacy interests. Id.
124 See Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 621-22 (1989) (holding
government has interest in ensuring safety of traveling public); see also Roe v. Marcotte,
193 F.3d 72, 78 (2d Cir. 1999) (DNA statute survived constitutional scrutiny because of
promoted state interest in maintaining public safety).
125 See People v. King, 99 Cal. Rptr. 2d 220, 227 (2000) (noting DNA testing helps
government ensure innocent persons are not needlessly investigated); People, supra note 17
and accompany text.
126 See id.
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Amendment requirements, may be found to be an extension of state police
powers, if conducted in accordance with a legitimate governmental interest. 127

For example, when Minnesota's DNA database statute came under
Fourth Amendment attack in 1995, it was upheld because of the institutional security needs inside Minnesota's prisons. 28 Similarly, in 1998 an
Oklahoma statute came under fire for requiring retrieval of DNA samples
from perpetrators of "sex-related crimes, violent crimes or other crimes in
which biological evidence is recovered.' 29 The prisoners in Oklahoma
argued that the statute violated their Fourth Amendment rights, but the
Tenth Circuit upheld the statute as reasonable due to the inmates' diminished privacy rights, the minimal intrusion involved in collecting the DNA
samples, and the legitimate government
interest in using DNA evidence to
130

investigate and prosecute crimes.
In 1999, Wyoming's DNA database was questioned, but nonetheless, was held constitutional. 31 A Wyoming court held that collecting
DNA samples either from the blood, saliva or hair of inmates did not violate the Fourth Amendment prohibition against unreasonable searches and
seizures because the procedures were minimally intrusive and convicted
felons had diminished privacy rights.'32 In conclusion, the Wyoming state
court held that the purpose of the DNA database was to collect identification information to advance the legitimate state interest of criminal law
enforcement. 133 Also in 1999, a Pennsylvania court held that the slight
intrusion occasioned by the withdrawal of blood is outweighed by the spe-

127 See supra notes 122-25 and accompanying text.

128See Kruger v. Erickson, 875 F. Supp. 583, 588-89 (D. Minn. 1994) (holding Minn.
Stat. § 609.3461 constitutional). In Kruger, petitioner/inmate was subjected to blood sampling while he was unconscious. Id. at 587. Petitioner argued that the statute allowing the
sampling was penal in nature, and therefore, unconstitutional under the Fourth Amendment.
Id. at 588. The Minnesota District Court disagreed, holding individuals who are lawfully
incarcerated have diminished expectations of privacy resulting from their status as prisoners, regardless of the governmental purpose for the search. ld..
129See Shaffer v. Saffle, 148 F.3d 1180, 1181 (10th Cir. 1998) (citing OKLA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 74, 150 270(A) (West 1996)) (holding DNA sampling reasonable due to inmate's
diminished privacy rights and legitimate government interests).
130 See id. at 1181.
131See Doles v. State, 994 P.2d 315, 316 (Wyo. 1999) (declaring WYO. STAT. ANN.
§§ 7-19-401-406 constitutional). The statute at issue in Doles required every person convicted of a felony to provide a DNA tissue sample for inclusion in Wyoming's DNA Identification Record System. Id. at 316. Doles, a convicted felon, argued that the statute violated his Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. Id.
at 317. The court rejected Doles' argument relying on other circuit court decisions and
declared Wyoming's statute mandating DNA collection from convicted felons reasonable
and not violative of inmates' Fourth Amendment privacy rights. Id. at 319.
32 See id. at 319.
133

See id.
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cial interest in maintaining an identification data bank of convicted felons. 134
More recently in 2000, California examined its requirement of inmates to surrender DNA evidence to prison officials. 35 The California
court found an inmate's expectation of privacy was greatly diminished in
light of the government's interests in fighting crime. 36 The California
Court of Appeals held that "the reduction of an inmate's reasonable expectation of privacy specifically extends to a prisoner's identity.' 37 The
state's interest, therefore, in maintaining a permanent record of identity to
be used as an aid in solving past and future crimes overcomes a prisoner's
individual privacy rights. 38 In short, the government has an undeniable
interest in crime prevention. 139 Finally, the California court held that DNA
40
testing is an efficient means of promoting these governmental interests.
Also in 2000, the Supreme Court of Indiana examined Indiana's42
4
procedures in collecting DNA evidence.1 1 In Smith v. State of Indiana,
authorities obtained a DNA sample from a rape victim and subsequently
produced a DNA profile using that sample. 43 Several months after the
rape, Patrick (Damon) Smith was arrested for a separate rape and ordered
to provide blood and saliva samples. 44 Although Smith was acquitted of
the second rape, his DNA matched the profile created during the first rape
investigation145 Smith tried to suppress the evidence claiming a posses-

sory right in his DNA, but the Indiana Supreme Court held that he had no
134See Dial v. Vaughn, 733 A.2d 1, 7 (Pa. 1999).
135See People v. King, 99 Cal. Rptr. 2d 220, 226-27 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002); supra note

92 and accompanying text.
136See id.; supra note 92 and accompanying text.
137See id. at 227; supra note 92 and accompanying text.
138 See id.
139 See id.

140See People v. King, 99 Cal. Rptr. 2d 220, 229-30 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000); supra note
92 and accompanying text.
141See Smith v. State of Indiana, 744 N.E.2d 437, 440 (Ind. 2001) (holding police
action in obtaining DNA sample from rape suspect and comparing to profile reasonable, not
invasion of privacy).
142 744 N.E.2d 437 (Ind.2001).
143 id.

144See id. at 439. In Smith, a victim was raped in her home but was unable to identify
the perpetrator. Id. at 438. Police created a DNA profile utilizing samples collected from
the victim. Id. Later, Damon Smith was arrested and charged with an unrelated crime. Id.
Smith was required to provide hair, blood and saliva samples to create a DNA profile on
him. Id. In compliance with police procedures, Smith's DNA profile was compared to
profiles maintained in the state's DNA data bank. Id. Smith's DNA profile matched that of
the profile created earlier from the rape victim. Id. Smith was arrested and tried for rape.
Id. Smith moved to suppress the DNA evidence arguing that it's admission violated his
Fourth Amendment rights. Id. The Court subsequently rejected Smith's argument and
allowed the evidence. Id. at 442.
145See id.
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ownership interests in his legitimately obtained DNA. 146 The advancement
of legitimate state interests of criminal law enforcement and in solving and
preventing crimes provides
the government with its strongest support for
147
upholding DNA dragnets.
IV. MASSACHUSETTS DECISIONS: AN OVERVIEW
A Supreme Court decision in this area will greatly impact Massachusetts' law enforcement practices, as well as the admissibility of DNA
evidence into trial. What follows is a look at Massachusetts' decisions that
will impact whether the Commonwealth should implement DNA dragnet
practices if they are ultimately found to be constitutional by the Supreme
Court. In 1994, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts (SJC) held
that the seizure of a blood sample pursuant to a warrant before an arrest or
indictment is reasonable where there is probable cause to believe that the
person whose blood is sought committed the crime and where that person
is afforded a hearing at which a judge makes a finding as to the degree of
intrusion involved and the need for the evidence sought in assisting the
state in the criminal investigation. 148 In The Matter of Lavigne,149 appellant
was the prime suspect in a murder that occurred twenty-one years prior to
the Commonwealth's request for a blood sample. 50 Although Lavigne
was the prime suspect in the murder, he had not been charged with the
offense nor was he the subject of a grand jury investigation.' 5' Nevertheless, a warrant was issued and the police obtained a blood sample from him
146

See id. at 439.

147 See People v. King, 99 Cal. Rptr. 2d 220, 227 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000) (noting DNA

testing furthers government interests in solving past and future crimes); Doles v. State, 994
P.2d 315, 316 (Wyo. 1999); Rise v. State of Oregon, 59 F.3d 1556 (9th Cir. 1995) (holding
genetic information gathering from convicted felons for identification purposes does not
violate Fourth Amendment).
146 See In the Matter of Richard R. Lavigne, 641 N.E.2d 1328, 1329-31, 418 Mass.
831, 832-35, (1994) (held search of unindicted, unarrested suspect reasonable, if conducted
with probable cause, after judicial hearing). The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts
(SJC) noted that prior to this case police had the right to search the body of a suspect who
had been arrested on probable cause. Id. (citing Commonwealth v. Brown, 237 N.E.2d 53,
58-59, 354 Mass. 337, 342-43 (1968)). Compounding the decision in Brown, the SJC in
Lavigne announced that it would extend the common law rule to provide that in order to
extract the DNA sample from an uncharged, unarrested suspect, the police need probable
cause to believe that the suspect committed the crime in question. Id. The SJC also held
that the suspect is entitled to a hearing to determine whether it is reasonable to compel the
suspect to submit to the DNA extraction. Id. At the hearing, the judge must weigh the
degree of intrusion on the suspect against the need for the evidence sought and the seriousness of the crime. Id. If the intrusion is minimal and the need for evidence is high, then the
intrusion will be considered reasonable and the extraction will be allowed. Id.
149 641 N.E.2d 1328, 418 Mass. 831 (1994).
150 Id. at 1329-30, 418 Mass. at 832-33.
151 See id.; 418 Mass. at 832-33.

20031

DNA DRAGNET PRACTICES

twenty-one years later. 52 Lavigne argued that the taking of his DNA was
an intrusion and as such, a violation of his Fourth Amendment rights to be
free of illegal searches and seizures.' 53 The SJC ruled in favor of the seizure of blood for criminal investigation purposes if based upon probable
cause and after a judicial hearing allowing the seizure.' 54 The dissent disagreed with the majority's holding because it effectively authorized the
forcible taking of blood from an unarrested, uncharged, and unindicted
person. 55 This decision effectively allows a suspect's blood to be
156 taken
absent being charged with a crime, but based upon probable cause.
In 1997, Massachusetts adopted St. 1997, ch. 106, an Act codifying
its DNA database statute. 57 Chapter 106 required that any person convicted of any one of the 33 enumerated crimes outlined therein was required to submit a DNA sample for inclusion in the Commonwealth's
DNA database.' 58 In 1999, that statute came under constitutional attack in
Landry v. Harshbarger159 In Landry, plaintiff convicts tried to prevent the
collection of blood samples for inclusion in Massachusetts' DNA database,
as authorized by Chapter 106.160 The statute applied to inmates convicted
of specific crimes and permitted the use of reasonable force to obtain the
samples from non-consenting inmates. 6' The Court held that involuntary
blood testing was not an unreasonable search and seizure in light of a convicted person's diminished privacy rights and the state's legitimate interest
in the investigation and prosecution of criminal acts.162 The SJC also held
that the Commonwealth had a right to preserve permanent identification
records of convicted persons for the purposes of resolving past and future
See id.; 418 Mass. at 832-33.
153 See id.; 418 Mass. at 832-33.
154 See id. at 1331-32, 418 Mass. at 834-35.
155 See In the Matter of Richard R. Lavigne, 641 N.E.2d 1328, 1335-36, 418 Mass.
831, 837-39, (1994) (Liacos, J., dissenting).
156 See id. at 1329-1330, 418 Mass. 832-33.
157 See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 22E, §§ 1-15.
158 id.
159 709 N.E.2d 1085, 1086, 429 Mass. 336, 337, (1999) (holding extraction of blood
from convicts for inclusion in state database reasonable). This Act created a new policy in
the Commonwealth whereby any person convicted of one of 33 enumerated crimes must
submit a DNA sample to the state crime lab. Id. at 1087, 429 Mass. at 338.
160 See id. at 1089, 429 Mass. at 340. See also MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 22E, §§ 1-15.
The statute provides that the director shall establish protocol governing the testing and
analysis of DNA samples and a quality assurance program. Id. The statute mandates that
these protocols and quality assurance programs be compatible with those utilized by the
FBI. Id.
161 See id. at 1087, 429 Mass. at 338.
162 See id. at 1091-92, 429 Mass. 441-42.
The SJC recognized the Commonwealth
152

had an indisputable interest in preserving a permanent identification record of convicted
persons for resolving past and future crimes. Id. The court announced that it will now use
DNA identification procedures for these purposes. Id.
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crimes.163 The SJC held the intrusion occasioned by the blood test was not
significant and was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment and under
MASS. CONST. art. XIV. 164 The SJC announced:
[W]hile obtaining and analyzing the DNA [under the Act] is
a search and seizure implicating Fourth Amendment concerns, it is a reasonable search and seizure ... in light of [a
convicted person's] diminished privacy rights . . . the minimal intrusion of ... blood tests; and the legitimate government interest in the investigation and prosecution of unsolved and future criminal acts by the use of DNA in a man65
ner not significantly different from the use of fingerprints.1
In 1999, the SJC visited the issue of whether the Commonwealth's
DNA database statute burdened inmates' fundamental privacy rights guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment. 66 In Murphy v. Department of Corrections, 67 Murphy challenged the statute holding that it should be subjected
to strict constitutional scrutiny and would, therefore, be found unconstitutional under this analysis.168 The SJC upheld Chapter 106 citing its recent
decision in Landry for authority. 69 As the SJC held in Landry, taking
blood samples from convicts to be used in the Commonwealth's DNA database does not violate fundamental rights because convicted persons have
a diminished expectation of privacy and the extraction of blood by a pin
prick is only minimally intrusive. 70 The SJC concluded that the proper
level of scrutiny, therefore, is rational basis rendering the statute constitutional under this analysis.17 ' These cases provide the Commonwealth with
a strong foundation for upholding DNA dragnet practices, i.e., the legiti161 See

id.

'64 See Landry v. Harshbarger, 709 N.E.2d 1085, 1092-93, 429 Mass. 336, 442-43,
(1999) (holding DNA results similar to use of fingerprints). The SJC held that DNA results

were similar to the use of fingerprint information in preserving a record of convicts. Id.
The procedure by which these results were obtained, as well as statutory restrictions, prevented the results from being used for obtaining impermissible genetic information. Id.
165 See id. at 1091-92, 429 Mass. at 441-42 (citing Boling v. Romer, 101 F.3d 1336,
1340 (10th Cir. 1996)) (holding Act provides for legitimate state interests and does not
violate Fourth Amendment).
166See Murphy v. Dep't of Corrections, 711 N.E.2d 149, 429 Mass. 736 (1999).
167 711 N.E.2d 149, 429 Mass. 736 (1999).
168 Id. at 152-53, 429 Mass. at 739-40 (statute applies to anyone convicted of one of 33
enumerated crimes on or after statute's effective date). Murphy argued that the Act violated
his fundamental right to privacy under the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 152, 429 Mass. at
739. Relying on its decision in Landry, the SJC held that taking blood samples from convicted criminals for use in the Commonwealth's DNA identification database does not
violate an inmate's fundamental rights. Id.
169 See id.
170 See id.
"'

See id.
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mate governmental interest of investigating and prosecuting criminal ac-

tions. 112
V.

CONCLUSION

In most privacy cases, whether a state is justified in searching and
seizing an individual's DNA turns on whether the compelling interest of
the state justifies the intrusion upon an individual's privacy. The test for a
compelling interest is whether the government's interest is reasonable
enough to justify the particular invasion of the constitutional right in question. The purpose must be fundamental and the state's legislation must
bear a reasonable relation to the achievement of that purpose. 73 Thus, a
compelling interest must be based upon the necessities of national or
community life such as clear threats to public health, safety, and welfare.
Proponents of DNA dragnet practices argue that the government is
justified in conducting such searches and seizures, absent a warrant or
probable cause. They base their argument on legitimate interests such as
creating records of identification, in preventing criminal activity, in solving
past and future crimes, and the advancement of criminal law enforcement.
They argue these interests outweigh a citizen's right not to be compelled to
give-up his DNA absent a warrant or probable cause.
Opponents, on the other hand, argue that these governmental interests, while legitimate and justified, must be confined to the restrictions of
the Fourth Amendment guarantying all persons to be free from illegal
searches and seizures.
The final question to be addressed before the Supreme Court is
whether DNA dragnet practices are an effective means for meeting these
governmental interests. Government representatives argue there is no
question that by providing an effective means of identification, DNA testing is an efficient method of promoting legitimate governmental interests.
However, this argument fails to address the reality that DNA dragnets impinge upon the very right that citizens of a free society deem as fundamental: the right to privacy.
The right to privacy should be preserved as a fundamental guaranty
provided to free citizens by the Fourth Amendment. By conducting DNA
172 See supra notes 148-68 and accompanying text.
173 See Robinson v. City of Seattle, 10 P.3d 452 (Wash. App. 2000) (citing Munns v.
Martin, 930 P.2d 318 (Wash. App. 1997)). The Robinson court held suspicionless
pre-employment drug testing provisions within the State of Washington as proper and abiding concern for government. Id. at 467. It holds that even with these compelling state
interests in keeping drugs off streets, courts must guard against government's abridgment of
fundamental constitutional rights afforded every citizen. Id. at 469-70. The court concluded that government's compelling right did not outweigh fundamental rights of its citizens. Id.
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dragnets, as a society, we are sanctioning the violation of one of the most
basic fundamental rights of any free society. Therefore, the preservation of
privacy requires the Supreme Court to refrain from holding DNA dragnet
practices constitutional.
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